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Summaries of Dissertations 549 
should use the same type of data and frequency for identifying peaks and troughs in all 
historical periods. 
Second, Davis looks for changes in the volatility of output across periods within the span 
of years covered by his index, that is, within the nineteenth century. Before Davis, this was 
a job that could scarcely be done at all. Davis finds that the individual component series 
show more volatility in earlier years, but the correlations between the components become 
tighter over time, so the volatility of the aggregate industrial-production index remains 
about the same. From this, Davis concludes that industrial-product markets became more 
integrated over time, whereas the severity of business cycles remained about the same 
before and after the War Between the States. On this topic, I think Davis ought to give 
more thought to the problem of measurement error in the component series, which he says 
is probably bigger in earlier years. I wonder how one can tell the difference between reduc- 
tions in measurement error and increases in market integration. I also wonder what one 
would say about changes in the volatility of the aggregate index if one excludes the periods 
for which we suspect measurement errors are relatively great. 
What next? There are plenty of entirely different things for Davis to do with his index 
and component series. He can give better answers to old questions about the effects of 
antebellum financial crises on real activity. He can tell us things we could not know before 
about interactions between industrial production, agriculture, and trade shocks, in periods 
when those interactions may have been important to the development of the American 
economy. Let us get together and make a list for him. 
CHRISTOPHER HANES, University of Mississippi 
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Comments on Geraghty, Mdrquez, and Vizcarra 
The discussant for non-American dissertations in 1984, the first year the Gerschenkron 
prize was awarded, was Joel Mokyr, and he began by noting that all the finalists, and 
perhaps all the submissions (that is not clear) dealt with Great Britain. He hoped that this 
was an aberration, and he got his wish. There were nine submissions this year: one dealt 
with Britain; three with Latin America; one with Sweden, and one with a Hong Kong-based 
conglomerate; the other three were comparative, dealing with Britain, the United States, 
and other European countries. Four ofthe dissertations were written in history departments, 
three in economics departments, one in an economic history department, and one in a 
department of management studies. All of the submissions were first rate, and the authors 
and their thesis supervisors should be proud of their work. 
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Thomas Geraghty's dissertation examines a topic that has been addressed many times 
before, recently by some people in this room: the rise and triumph of the factory system in 
Britain. Geraghty groups earlier work on the rise of the factory into four views: focusing on 
scale economies, transactions costs, asymmetric information, and political economy. He 
maintains that there are problems with each of these explanations. The scale-economies view 
offers no explanation for the organizational changes typically associated with factory produc- 
tion. The transactions-cost and asymmetric-information views cannot explain the timing of 
the transition to factories, and many of the efficiency gains stressed by these views could have 
been achieved outside of the factory system. The political-economy view has various prob- 
lems, and Geraghty devotes little attention to it in the rest of the dissertation. 
In place ofthese earlier explanations, Geraghty offers his own, "complementarity hypoth- 
esis." According to this view, firms that adopted the new technologies also found it profit- 
able to adopt organizational innovations, including more intensive supervision, disciplinary 
systems, and new compensation schemes for workers. The machinery associated with the 
factory system enabled manufacturers to improve, and standardize, the quality of goods 
produced, which raised the return to ensuring that employees paid close attention to work- 
manship. Manufacturers who set up a factory therefore faced a "multitask agency prob- 
lem"-how to get their workers to produce at a high volume, but also to pay strict attention 
to the quality of production and to the maintenance of expensive machinery which they did 
not own. Because workmanship and asset maintenance largely were unobservable, piece- 
rate contracts could not solve the multitask problem, which required increased supervision 
of the workforce. Thus, the complementarity hypothesis, unlike the other explanations for 
the rise of the factory system, can explain both why factories were large and why they 
developed their distinctive internal organizational structure. 
In chapter 3 Geraghty develops a mathematical model of an employer's organizational 
and technological choice. The model is something a mathematical economist would love. 
In order to determine the employer's optimal strategy, Geraghty uses "the theory of mono- 
tone comparative statics using supermodular functions." The model is clever, but will be 
confusing to most economic historians, and I would move it to an appendix. 
The heart of the dissertation is the series of firm studies in chapters 4-7, which exam- 
ine the development of the factory system in textiles, iron, metals, engineering, pottery, 
and glassmaking. Geraghty contends that firms that adopted both machinery and organi- 
zational innovations support the complementarity hypothesis. The persistence of"disor- 
ganized factories"-which adopted machinery but allowed employee work habits similar 
to those of the domestic system-or "nonmechanized factories"-which adopted organi- 
zational innovations but not machinery-would support the economies-of-scale and 
transactions-cost hypotheses, and be evidence against the complementarity story. Rather 
than do in-depth case studies, Geraghty devotes a few pages each to (by my count) 30 
firms, relying mostly on secondary sources. These chapters provide a rich and detailed 
discussion of the development of the factory system in early industrial Britain. Any 
analysis based on a large number of firms in several industries is bound to yield results 
that are somewhat messy, and this is no exception. On the whole, however, the firm 
studies support his hypothesis that technological changes and organizational innovations 
went together. In the final chapter, Geraghty creates a data set with information on 
technology and organizational structure for 75 factories in nine industries, and finds that 
the use of machinery was positively correlated with regulated work conditions and the 
supervision of workers. 
I found Geraghty's story largely convincing. He presents both qualitative and quantita- 
tive evidence showing that the adoption of production machinery increased the marginal 
net benefits from adopting supervision, regulated work conditions, and new forms of 
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compensation. The thesis is impressive, but I have a few suggestions for revisions. The 
discussion of factories' compensation systems is a bit sketchy. Geraghty contends that the 
shift from the domestic system to the factory system led to a shift from payment by piece 
rates to payment by time rates, but his empirical analysis shows that the conditional corre- 
lation between machinery and time rates was negative. Moreover, his firm studies indicate 
that compensation systems were more complicated than his model suggests. In some 
factories, workers were paid a weekly wage, but with piece-rate bonuses in order to stimu- 
late productivity. Many firms also adopted systems of fines for poor workmanship or 
inattention to machine maintenance, which suggests that it was possible for some factories 
to measure the quality of workmanship. I would like to see Geraghty offer a more detailed 
analysis of the changing nature of compensation systems in a few firms for which archival 
data are available. In this way he could make an important contribution to the historical 
branch of the developing field of Personnel economics. 
Geraghty's case studies suggest that for several firms another effect of the adoption of 
machinery was the deskilling of the workforce. New machinery often enabled manufactur- 
ers to replace skilled craftsmen with lower skilled men, women, and children. This was true 
not only in textiles but also to some extent in iron (puddling and rolling), engineering, and 
pottery. Skilled craftsmen were expensive, and they tended to resist organizational innova- 
tions such as supervision and discipline. The factories that came closest to adopting 
continuous-flow production techniques also were the ones that were most likely to replace 
skilled with unskilled workers. This is an important aspect of the rise of the factory system, 
and it needs to be addressed in more detail. 
Whereas Geraghty' s dissertation deals with a topic long-debated by economic historians, 
the other two dissertations are part of an explosion of research in what had been until 
recently a neglected subject-Latin American economic history. Graciela Marquez's 
dissertation examines protectionism in Mexico from the beginning of the restored republic 
in 1868 to the Revolution of 1911. Part 1 provides a detailed examination of the political 
economy of tariff reform during this period. Part 2 examines the effects of the Mexican 
monetary regime, and in particular the depreciation of silver after 1873, on protection, and 
calculates ad valorem tariff rates and rates of "total protection" for 1892-1910. 
The dissertation is monumental in size, with 314 pages of text and another 281 pages of 
appendices. The appendices present specific tariff rates (that is, taxes per unit of quantity) 
for several hundred commodities for each of the six tariffs adopted between 1872 and 1905, 
changes in tariff rates between major pieces of legislation, and ad valorem rates (that is, 
taxes as a percentage of the price of the good) for 32 commodities from 1892 to 1910. 
These data will be quite useful for economic historians interested in the history of Mexican 
commercial policy, and I predict that (until a book appears) Marquez's thesis will log 
thousands of frequent flyer miles traveling about the country on interlibrary loan. 
The examination of the political economy of protection in chapters 1-3 brings together 
the information on tariff rates in the appendices and qualitative data from various primary 
sources, including the archives of the Hacienday Credito Publico (Hacienda for short), the 
government ministry in charge of budget design, tax collection, and control of customs 
houses. Marquez weaves these sources into an analytic narrative of the nearly constant 
debates over the tariff in the last third of the nineteenth century. In Mexico, as in many 
economies at the time, tariffs played two important, and conflicting, roles. First, they 
served as a major source of revenue for the central government-for most of the period 
from 1868 to 1888, import duties made up 50 percent or more of total revenue. Second, 
tariffs served as a method of protecting domestic industries from lower-cost foreign compe- 
tition. The problem, of course, was that the optimal level of tariffs for generating revenue 
typically was lower than the optimal level for protecting domestic industries. 
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The government's quandary over tariff policy is made clear in Part 1. In the debate that 
led up to the tariff of 1872, Romero, the Secretary of Hacienda, claimed to favor the ideal 
of free trade, but he set as a constraint for the new tariff that import duty receipts could not 
fall below current levels-a constraint made necessary by the importance of tariff revenue 
as a source of government funds. Throughout the period from 1868 to 1887, the main 
objective of tariff policy was to generate revenue. In 1887, however, the government 
shifted its commercial policy toward promoting industrial development, and maintained 
this orientation until 1911. Marquez contends that this shift in policy was possible because 
a rescheduling of foreign debt payments, renewed access to foreign credit, and an increase 
in domestic taxes eased budget problems and reduced the need for tariff revenue. 
In chapter 4 Marquez extends her discussion of protection to include the effects of silver 
depreciation. The sharp decline in the price of silver that began in the 1870s and continued 
into the early twentieth century caused a depreciation of the Mexican currency, which 
drove up the price of imports, and offered manufacturers additional nontariff protection 
against foreign competition. However, declining silver prices also raised the price of im- 
ported raw materials and machinery, along with the real costs of government foreign debt 
obligations, which created serious budgetary problems. Eventually the costs outweighed 
the benefits, and in 1905 Mexico adopted the gold standard, thus ending the nontariff 
protection associated with silver. In order to protect those sectors that had benefited from 
the frequent silver devaluations, the government also adopted the Tariff of 1905, which 
raised duties on many finished products. 
Chapter 5, in my opinion, contains Marquez's most important contributions. She com- 
bines data on specific tariffs and price changes to construct ad valorem tariff rates for 32 
manufactured products in six representative industries (cotton, paper, beer, soap, cement, 
iron, and steel) for 1892/93 to 1909/10, and finds that the level of protection dropped 
sharply in the 1890s, and then increased slightly after 1903. She decomposes the tariff rates 
into legislative and price components, and shows that the decline in rates in the 1890s was 
driven almost completely by price changes, as most specific tariff rates remained 
unchanged during the decade. Finally, she offers a measure of "total protection," which 
adjusts the ad valorem tariff to take account of exchange-rate fluctuations. Total protection 
also declined during the 1890s and increased slightly after 1905, although it was more 
volatile than the ad valorem rate, and was quite high in some years, such as 1893 and 1897. 
Marquez's dissertation will be a starting point for future research on Mexican commer- 
cial policy before the First World War, and will be useful for anyone studying the late- 
nineteenth-century Mexican economy. However, there are ways in which it could be im- 
proved. The thesis needs a more detailed discussion of the government's nontariff eco- 
nomic policies in order to better place its commercial policy in context. For example, 
Marquez contends that the shift in tariff policy in the late 1880s from revenue generation 
to protection was made possible by an easing of the government's public finance problems, 
resulting in large part from a sharp increase in domestic tax revenue. She does not explain 
why tax revenue increased. Did the government raise taxes, or did economic growth gener- 
ate additional tax revenue? If the latter, perhaps it could be argued that the beginnings of 
industrialization caused the change in commercial policies rather than vice versa. 
Marquez maintains that in the 1890s tariffpolicy played an important role in "the govern- 
ment's industrial development plans," but these development plans are never spelled out. 
Did the government follow an explicit import-substitution strategy? Did it subsidize manu- 
facturing firms or interest rates? How did nontariff economic policies in the 1870s and 
1880s differ from those in the 1890s? The rich archival sources that she employs in dis- 
cussing tariff policy presumably also could shed more light on nontariff aspects of govern- 
ment economic policy. 
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Marquez's estimates in chapter 5 show that ad valorem tariff rates declined sharply in 
the 1890s. It is not clear, however, whether this decline began around 1892, or whether 
rates had been declining throughout the 1880s. It is difficult to determine the extent to 
which there was a change in government tariff policy around 1890 without estimates of ad 
valorem tariff rates before 1892. I understand that data problems make this difficult, but 
the estimates of ad valorem rates in 1874/75 presented in Table 5.10 suggest that some 
estimate of the long-term trend in protection is possible. I suggest that she attempt to 
construct ad valorem rates for a few benchmark years, perhaps the years of tariff reforms: 
1872, 1880, and 1885. 
Finally, I would like to see more discussion of the effects of the government's commer- 
cial policy on Mexican economic development. Marquez claims that the trade barriers 
created in the late nineteenth century led to a rapid expansion of manufacturing, but she 
does not examine the effects of changing levels of protection on the importation of finished 
goods or on the rate of growth of the leading sectors in Mexican industrialization. It ap- 
pears from chapter 5 that data on the quantity of imports from 1892 onwards are readily 
available, which would enable her to report trends in the importation of finished goods as 
well as intermediate goods that would have been used as inputs by domestic manufacturers. 
This is an important issue, given the debate in recent decades on the pros and cons of 
import substitution policies, and I believe that Marquez should examine it head on. 
Catalina Vizcarra' s dissertation examines the Royal Tobacco Monopoly in Peru from its 
inception in 1752 to 1813. The tobacco industry was an important part of the colonial 
Peruvian economy, and the Bourbon monarchy instituted the monopoly in order to increase 
fiscal revenue. The traditional literature contends that the monopoly produced meager 
revenues, which were remitted to Spain. Vizcarra challenges this conclusion. She uses data 
obtained from archives in Peru and Seville to reconstruct he revenue of the tobacco mo- 
nopoly, and finds that it was in fact quite successful, providing a significant share of the 
revenues for the Viceroyalty of Peru throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Moreover, while some of this revenue was remitted to Spain, especially after the mid- 
1780s, a large share remained in the colonies. 
Vizcarra divides her discussion of the monopoly into three periods: 1752-1779, 
1780-1792, and 1792-1813. Prior to 1752 there was a sales tax on tobacco, but it yielded 
little revenue because of an extensive contraband trade-Vizcarra estimates that from 1725 
to 1746, 70-80 percent of tobacco was traded illegally. The monopoly was established, in 
large part, to reduce this contraband. In the early period, the monopoly set prices for to- 
bacco leaf and production quotas for planters. As the sole legal buyer of tobacco, it pur- 
chased leaf, transported it to Lima, and sold it to licensed workshops, where cigars and 
cigarettes were produced. These could be sold only in licensed stores. Penalties were 
established for planters who did not comply with production quotas or who sold leaf 
illegally. The regulations succeeded in reducing contraband, and the monopoly earned 
relatively high revenues in the 1760s and 1770s. However, the state faced another financial 
crisis in the late 1770s, and tried to alleviate it by generating more revenue from the mo- 
nopoly. As a result, in the 1780s the monopoly adopted tighter control of the tobacco 
industry. The cultivation of tobacco was strictly regulated and monitored. Harsher penalties 
were established against contraband, expenditures on enforcement increased, and the 
government centralized the production of tobacco, shutting down private workshops and 
establishing state-run factories in Lima and Trujillo. These were nonmechanized factories 
as discussed by Geraghty- workers were brought ogether and supervised, but the produc- 
tion process was similar to that in the workshops. The state factories were created not to 
increase production but as a means to control contraband. Strict supervision and discipline 
were meant to prevent collusion between workers in order to prevent fraud and maintain 
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quality. Packs of cigarettes and cigars produced in the factories were stamped with a gov- 
ernment seal, in order to make it easier to detect contraband tobacco. 
The overall result of the reforms of the early 1780s was a sharp increase in revenue, as 
Vizcarra shows in chapter 5, where she examines monopoly finances. She considers various 
possible causes of the increase in revenues, including exogenous shifts in demand or in the 
cost function, and concludes that revenues increased because the government increased the 
mark-up on cigarettes and cigars, and because it succeeded in reducing contraband. The 
cost of controlling contraband was high, but the benefits (namely the revenue from in- 
creased legal sales) were greater. The era of high revenues was short lived, however. After 
the deaths of Galvez in 1787 and of Charles III in 1788, there were significant changes in 
the administration of the monopoly. The state factories were shut down in 1791, regulations 
on the cultivation of tobacco were reduced, and the enforcement against contraband was 
moderated. Despite a sharp cut in bureaucratic osts, the overall effect of the reforms was 
a decline in net revenue. 
Vizcarra's dissertation is a valuable addition to the literature on the effects of the Bour- 
bon reforms on the colonial economy. It is based largely on archival sources, and it pres- 
ents important new data on monopoly revenues and costs. The thesis would be even more 
useful if it contained a data appendix, in which time series on tobacco production, con- 
sumption, and prices, and monopoly revenues and costs were presented for the entire 
period, and in which the construction of each of these series was discussed in detail. As it 
is, the data are scattered throughout the text, and much information is reported in the form 
of figures rather than tables. 
I learned a lot from Vizcarra's thesis, and I hope it will lead her to address other aspects 
of the colonial Peruvian economy. When she comes to revise the thesis, I would like to see 
her devote more attention to some important issues dealing with the period after 1787 that she 
addressed only in passing. First, it is not clear why, given the high revenues generated in the 
1780s, the Spanish crown transformed the monopoly into a more lenient (and less profitable) 
tax in the 1790s. In some colonies the new tax apparently was meant to reduce conflicts with 
local elites, but Vizcarra gives no evidence that this was the case in Peru. The monopoly had 
been established in order to increase fiscal revenues. Did the crown's need for revenue decline 
in the 1790s? Did it believe, incorrectly, that the reforms would increase monopoly revenues? 
Or did the American and French Revolutions convince the crown that it was worth sacrificing 
some revenue in order to maintain peace in the colonies? 
The dissertation ends in 1813, seven years before Peruvian independence and the end of 
the monopoly. I wish that Vizcarra had extended the analysis up to 1820, or even beyond, 
to examine the development of the tobacco industry in the first few decades after independ- 
ence. In the introduction she writes that an understanding of Bourbon economic policies 
is especially relevant for the debate on the origins of Latin American underdevelopment. 
By stopping in 1813, her dissertation is less helpful in understanding the long-run impact 
of the monopoly on the Peruvian economy than it might have been. I would urge her 
therefore, in revising the thesis, to add a chapter examining the tobacco industry after 1820. 
Most conveners of the dissertation session end with a statement similar to that made by 
the President of the United States at the beginning of the State of the Union address, and 
I will continue the tradition. I can say, after reading the nine non-American dissertations 
submitted this year, that the field of economic history is strong, and that it will continue to 
prosper. 
GEORGE R. BOYER, Cornell University 
